What lies behind the new call by the OCU for “dialogue”

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05 February 15:51
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Is Patriarch Bartholomew behind the OCU’s “call for dialogue”? Photo: UOJ Is Patriarch Bartholomew behind the OCU’s “call for dialogue”? Photo: UOJ

The main aim of the OCU’s “appeal” is not dialogue with the UOC but the creation of an alibi before Constantinople.

On February 2, 2026, the OCU “Holy Synod” published an appeal addressed, as stated in the headline, to “Orthodox believers, clergy, and hierarchs in Ukraine who depend on the position of the Moscow Patriarchate.” The document, signed by Serhiy (Epifaniy) Dumenko, is presented as yet another call for dialogue and church unity. However, a detailed analysis of the text, its wording, and its context shows that this is not a sincere attempt at reconciliation but rather a fairly crude manipulation aimed at an external audience – first and foremost, the Patriarchate of Constantinople.

An insult instead of an appeal: whom is the document addressed to?

The first thing that catches the eye is the very title. Instead of the official name “Ukrainian Orthodox Church”, which has been used for more than thirty years both in Ukraine and abroad, the authors of the appeal use an absurd and demeaning formulation: “those who depend on the position of the Russian Patriarchate.”

Negotiators – and simply reasonable people – know that any sincere call for dialogue begins with a respectful address to the interlocutor, with recognition of their dignity and their right to their own position.

In this case, we see the opposite. From the very first words, the authors demonstrate a desire to demean the addressee and attach hackneyed labels whose purpose is once again to emphasize that the UOC is not an independent Church but a “dependent structure”. Clearly, such language does not lead to dialogue; it is the ordinary language of propaganda.

Moreover, such wording creates an absurd situation: the UOC formally has no reason to respond to this text since it is addressed to “those who depend on the position of the Russian Patriarchate.” Specifically, who is meant? If it is the UOC, then it does not depend on the position of the Russian Patriarchate. Whom is the appeal addressed to? A church with that name? It does not exist. It turns out that the appeal is written to nowhere – just for show, to create the appearance of dialogue where none was intended.

Selective memory: what the OCU keeps silent about

The second important point is the manipulation of the history of dialogue. The appeal claims that for seven years the OCU sent the UOC “letters and appeals” calling for dialogue, but “they received neither a positive response nor even a formal reply from the official leadership”.

This claim is striking in its falsehood. It is enough to refer to the documents of the UOC Council held in Feofania on May 27, 2022. In the decisions of this Council, the highest body of church authority, there is a separate point specifically dedicated to the issue of relations with the OCU. It contains specific conditions for a possible dialogue:

  • to stop seizures of UOC churches,
  • to resolve the problem of the absence of apostolic succession (ordination),
  • to recognize the imperfections of the OCU’s autocephalous status.

To call the decision of the Church Council “not even a formal response” is not just a distortion of facts – it is a deliberate lie. The UOC gave a comprehensive and official answer at the highest church level.

The other question is that this response did not satisfy the OCU leadership, because it required real, not declarative, steps from them. Moreover, the UOC put forward not abstract demands but quite specific and verifiable conditions. The simplest of these is the cessation of church seizures.

What do we see in practice? The seizures have not only continued but intensified many times over. Across Ukraine, UOC parishes are being transferred under the jurisdiction of the OCU, often with the use of physical force, involving local authorities, and grossly violating religious rights.

If the OCU leadership were truly committed to dialogue, the first step would have been to fulfill at least this minimal requirement. But instead, we receive yet another “appeal” in which all the blame for the lack of unity is placed on the other side.

Contradictions in its own position

The next point requiring attention is the internal inconsistency of the OCU’s position. On one hand, the appeal contains a complaint that the bishops and clergy of the UOC ignored the OCU’s “Unification Council” in 2018 and that “only two metropolitans” attended. On the other hand, all the years since the OCU creation, Serhiy Dumenko has consistently stated that his structure united all of Ukrainian Orthodoxy.

So, what is the truth? If the OCU had already united all of Ukrainian Orthodoxy back in 2018, why call anyone today for dialogue and unity? If, on the other hand, the majority of Ukraine’s Orthodox faithful remained outside the OCU (which corresponds to reality), then all previous statements about a “universal unification” were deceptive.

This contradiction reveals the OCU’s main problem: its leadership lives in a world of propaganda clichés, actively promotes them, and now has to keep repeating them even when they conflict with each other.

Even more telling is the comparison of the present appeal with public statements made by Serhiy Dumenko three years ago. In 2023, commenting on the possibility of unification with the UOC, he stated outright that he saw no point in it: “We do not need collaborators in our ranks who hate everything Ukrainian.”

A natural question arises: what has changed? Why have those who three years ago “hated everything Ukrainian,” and whom one should not even approach, suddenly become desirable partners for dialogue? Have the millions of the UOC faithful changed their views in the meantime? Or perhaps circumstances have changed, forcing the OCU leadership to alter its rhetoric?

The answer is obvious: the position of the Constantinople side has changed. During Dumenko’s most recent visit to the Phanar, Patriarch Bartholomew publicly demanded that he “seek ways to engage with UOC bishops through dialogue.” Notably, even the Patriarch of Constantinople in his statements uses the name UOC rather than humiliating euphemisms like “those who depend on the position of the Russian Patriarchate.”

Thus, the appeal is not the result of internal reconsideration, nor the fruit of “spiritual insight,” but a forced reaction to external pressure. It is an attempt to show Constantinople the appearance of efforts toward unity, while there is a complete lack of real readiness for it.

Dialogue without preconditions?

The appeal contains a call to “begin dialogue without putting forward preconditions.” To understand what these words mean, let us look at reality.

First, the OCU itself sets a very strict precondition – to recognize it as the only canonical Church in Ukraine, which has the Tomos of autocephaly. All the wording of the appeal is built on the presumption that the OCU is the “right” Church, and that the UOC must acknowledge this.

Second, the call for dialogue “without preconditions” is hypocritical in a situation where one side continues active hostile actions against the other. Imagine one person, while beating another, saying to them: “Let’s have a dialogue, but without any conditions on your part.” Absurd? That is exactly the situation between the OCU and the UOC.

Real dialogue without preconditions is possible only in an atmosphere of mutual respect and the cessation of hostile actions.

If the OCU truly wants dialogue, the first step is obvious: declare a moratorium on church seizures, return illegally seized property, and stop persecuting the clergy and faithful of the UOC. Only after this can one talk about a constructive talk.

But we see nothing of the sort. On the contrary, the seizures continue, the pressure increases, and the very appeal for “dialogue” is clearly published just “for show” rather than to achieve any real result.

The true purpose of the appeal

Analyzing the document as a whole, one cannot help shaking the impression that its main goal is not dialogue with the UOC but the creation of an alibi before Constantinople. It is a kind of “excuse”: we tried, we made efforts, we called for dialogue, we even created a commission, but they do not want it. And since that is the case, we are “clean before God and people” and can continue acting as before.

This tactic is well known in politics: to create the appearance of effort in order to later put the blame on the opponent. In church life, this is called Phariseeism when outward piety is used to cover up inner rot and the unwillingness to make real changes.

It is definitely the pressure from the Patriarchate of Constantinople that prompted the appeal. Patriarch Bartholomew, evidently concerned about the worldwide spread of information regarding the seizures of UOC churches, demanded that Dumenko intensify dialogue with the UOC.

But instead of genuinely changing its position, the OCU leadership maintains its previous rhetoric and practices unchanged. Dumenko merely imitates vigorous activity before Patriarch Bartholomew, having no intention of actually changing anything.

Yes, for a time this imitation may deceive the Patriarchate of Constantinople, but it will not solve the real problems. This means that sooner or later the question of “unity” in Ukrainian Orthodoxy will arise again with renewed force since it cannot be resolved through empty statements.

What would become a real step toward dialogue?

For the OCU’s appeal to be taken seriously, it would need to include the following elements:

  • the use of the official name “Ukrainian Orthodox Church” instead of humiliating terms;
  • recognition of the problem of church seizures, violence, and the use of administrative resources;
  • the declaration of a moratorium on “transfers” and the return of illegally seized property;
  • willingness to discuss the OCU’s own canonical issues, including questions regarding the validity of ordinations and apostolic succession;
  • a plan for dialogue specifying topics, format, and possible compromises.

None of these elements appear in the appeal. And it is unlikely that they ever would.

By portraying the UOC as “collaborators” and “FSB agents”, the OCU has conditioned society to think that its bishops, clergy, and faithful are enemies. And one does not conduct dialogue with enemies – enemies are destroyed. Therefore, any real steps by the OCU toward the UOC today would be perceived as weakness and betrayal.

Mystery of the “Shostatsky-Yurysty” swap

In the decisions of the OCU Synod, there is one point that caused genuine bewilderment: the transfer of Metropolitan Simeon (Shostatsky) of Vinnytsia to Khmelnytskyi, and Pavlo Yurysty in the opposite direction.

According to the UOJ, this decision came as an unpleasant surprise for Shostatsky. He had been in Vinnytsia for 19 years, with established relations with the authorities, a large eparchial administration, and a cathedral (seized from the UOC), etc. The conditions in Khmelnytskyi are much worse. After the death of the previous “hierarch”, Antony Makhota, the OCU’s eparchial administration in Khmelnytskyi remains closed, and the widow and son of Makhota are fighting over the property in court (it’s typical behavior for OCU bishops, so don’t be surprised). Pavlo Yurysty, while in his cathedral, lived in a rented apartment. Apparently, the same prospect awaits Shostatsky.

But the main point is not even this. It was Shostatsky whom Epifaniy appointed head of the commission for “dialogue” with the UOC. And this is no coincidence. According to the UOJ sources in the Phanar, during the most recent visit to Istanbul, the head of the OCU was given an operational task to normalize relations with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Otherwise, as Dumenko was hinted, the Patriarch of Constantinople might find a more suitable figure.

It should be recalled that “Metropolitan” Simeon (Shostatsky) was second only to Epifaniy at the “Unification Council”, and it was only the efforts of Filaret that prevented him from becoming head of the OCU. And today, as the Phanar sets the task of normalizing relations with the UOC, his figure becomes more significant.

In the current situation, Dumenko and his advisor Zoria have devised a “subtle plan.” Shostatsky is being sent to another region, while simultaneously being burdened with a losing task of “dialogue” with the UOC – the very dialogue that the OCU leadership is clearly sabotaging. And if the commission’s work yields no results, the blame will fall on its head – “Metropolitan” Simeon. This is what Dumenko and Zoria will report back across the Bosporus.

Conclusion

Thus, we conclude that the appeal of the OCU “Holy Synod” dated February 2, 2026, is not a document aimed at genuinely overcoming the church schism. It is a PR move directed at an external audience, primarily the Patriarchate of Constantinople. It is an attempt to create the appearance of effort where no real effort exists or is expected.

In the OCU’s actions, we see the continuation of the previous line – only now this continuation is flavored with rhetoric about dialogue to appease Constantinople.

For this reason, the faithful of the UOC, as well as its clergy and bishops, have every right not to respond to this document until specific actions follow the words. For it is said: “Not everyone who says to Me, ‘Lord, Lord,’ shall enter the Kingdom of Heaven, but he who does the will of My Father who is in heaven” (Matt. 7:21). And the will of God lies in truth, justice, and sincere love, not in manipulation and hypocrisy.

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