Social Survey on the Religious Situation in Ukraine: What Do the Numbers Say?
A poll by the "Rating" group showed a beautiful religious picture. However, the figures themselves indicate that in reality everything is deplorable: both with religion and with the unity of society.
On June 3, 2026, the "Rating" group published the results of an all-Ukrainian survey "Assessment of the Religious Situation in Ukraine," conducted based on interviews with 2,000 respondents. The presentation and discussion of these results took place at the "Ukrinform" agency. The event was also attended by the head of DESS V. Yelensky, MP N. Poturaev, and political scientist O. Zakyan.
The results were presented by co-founder of the "Rating" group A. Antipovich. He painted a beautiful and convenient picture of the religious situation in Ukraine for the Ukrainian authorities: 60% positively assess the creation of the OCU, 57% support the idea of banning the UOC, 67% support sanctions against Metropolitan Onuphrius, and 79% are in favor of the state regulating the activities of religious organizations if they pose a threat to Ukraine.
But if we look at the survey results a bit more carefully, the picture appears in a completely different light. And the conclusions drawn from these results are, for the most part, manipulation.
Manipulation 1: sociology during wartime
Many sociologists claim that during wartime, the results of opinion polls (even if conducted in good faith) are quite conditional and by no means reflect the real picture of society's moods. Respondents simply fear answering questions frankly. It is much safer to give answers that fit the dominant ideology. At the same time, the telephone method used in this survey significantly increases the risk of socially desirable responses. This is claimed by Canadian political scientist Aaron Erlich, who studied the peculiarities of Ukrainian sociology.
Therefore, this "Rating" survey should be treated not so much as a real reflection of reality, but rather as part of an information campaign aimed at supporting the actions of the current Ukrainian authorities.
Manipulation 2: there's no conflict in my district, but there is one in the country
Let's compare two figures: 74% of respondents believe that relations between believers of different churches in their locality are friendly or calm. At the same time, when it comes to Ukraine as a whole, only 48% believe there is no conflict, while 44% define interfaith relations as tense or conflicted.
What does this mean? It means that near a person there may be a UOC temple attended by ordinary Ukrainian citizens, where a normal priest serves and nothing "unpatriotic" happens. But this same person has been convinced by media and social networks that somewhere in Ukraine there are terrible "Moscow priests" who support the RF, propagate the "Russian world" and harm our country in every way.
A recent example: Donetsk "metropolitan" of the OCU Sergey Gorobtsov, who for some reason lives not in his diocese but in Kyiv, called the UOC an "enemy" and a "cancerous tumor" and said that priests "fight for the souls of Ukrainians, depriving people of freedom, dignity and the right to independently choose their future." And people may well believe this, although near them there may be a UOC temple where no one deprives anyone of "freedom, dignity and rights."
Interestingly, the co-founder of "Rating" at the presentation actually acknowledged this mechanism: if a person has "everything calm in their locality" but believes that "things are bad in Ukraine," it means the assessment is influenced by the information picture.
Manipulation 3: "connection with the ROC" as a given
In the survey, 57% support the idea of banning UOC activities "due to connections with the ROC," and 67% support sanctions against Metropolitan Onuphrius for the same reason.
V. Yelensky and other ill-wishers of the UOC are triumphant: society allegedly approves their course toward destroying the country's most numerous confession. It would seem to be remarkable unanimity. But there's a nuance: the connection between the UOC and ROC was declared by DESS itself – without a court decision, without a truly independent religious expertise. Officials simply slapped a label on the Church at the authorities' behest – and it's precisely this label, not the actual state of affairs, that respondents are reacting to.
In reality, on April 6, 2026, the Sixth Administrative Court of Appeal overturned the conclusions of the "expertise" of the UOC charter, which became the basis for the subsequent "recognition" of the UOC as affiliated with the ROC. The judicial process regarding the ban on the activities of the Kyiv Metropolia of the UOC is far from complete. And the UOC itself categorically denies its affiliation with the ROC and declares its complete autonomy and independence.
But "Rating" poses corresponding questions as if the "connection with the ROC" is already an established and proven fact. For example, on the page with the question "Why don't you consider yourself belonging to any confession?" there is this answer: "Due to the UOC's connection with the ROC."
UN experts also drew attention to this point. In October 2025, they stated that formulations like "Russian world," "pro-Russian church" are incompatible with the principle of legal certainty and create the risk of criminalizing freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
Manipulation 4: "we didn't read it, but we're outraged"
This catchphrase, describing late Soviet society, could not be more fitting for the results of this opinion poll. People support sanctions while not knowing the church reality.
According to Antipovich, a third of respondents don't know Epiphanius, almost 40% don't know Metropolitan Onuphrius, and 60% don't know the Ecumenical Patriarch. At the same time, 67% support sanctions against Metropolitan Onuphrius. But how can one consciously support sanctions against a person if you don't even know about him?
Very simply: people are reacting not to Metropolitan Onuphrius's personality, but to the label that authorities, media and social networks have stuck on him.
The same ignorance is visible in the assessment of various confessions' status. 24% believe that the UOC is an independent Ukrainian Church, 21% believe it's a Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, and 44% cannot decide.
But then how can 57% support banning the UOC "due to connections with the ROC" if only 21% are convinced that this connection exists?
That is, sympathies and antipathies toward religious confessions are determined not so much by religious convictions as by the image that media resources have created for each confession.
Manipulation 5: support for the OCU is more politics than religion
According to the survey, 60% of Ukrainians positively assess the creation of the OCU. But only 13% of respondents frequently or very frequently attend services. Among representatives of the OCU and UOC, only about 18% regularly go to church.
The largest Orthodox "confession" in Ukraine is neither the OCU nor the UOC, but... "simply Orthodox." 26% of respondents identify with this "confession." By the way, how many of them simply feared admitting their belonging to the UOC? But let's not focus on this. Another 16% call themselves believers not belonging to any confession.
All this means that people see in the OCU not so much a church as a symbol of Ukrainian statehood, an attribute of independence, a certain political phenomenon. And at the same time, it's not necessary to understand the subtleties of canonical structure, to question how much the OCU's activities correspond to the Gospel, or to attend church at all.
Manipulation 6: "there are no persecutions"?
According to the survey results, 88% of respondents have not encountered persecution due to religious beliefs either personally or through relatives. Does this mean there are no persecutions? Those in power answer: yes. Everything is wonderful, there is unprecedented religious freedom in Ukraine.
But at the same time, the survey showed that 5% of respondents reported persecution of themselves personally and another 7% reported persecution of relatives or acquaintances. That is, every tenth Ukrainian has experienced persecution personally or heard about it from their relatives. And again: how many respondents were afraid to say this?
According to the assessment of Social Policy Minister Denis Ulyutin, 22-25 million people live in the controlled territory. And if we extrapolate to this number those 5% who reported persecution of themselves personally and 7% who reported persecution of relatives – even considering that the survey was conducted among adults – it turns out to be simply a huge figure. Hundreds of thousands persecuted for their faith. In democratic Ukraine!
The participants of the presentation at "Ukrinform" actually confirmed the existence of persecution. Thus, the head of DESS V. Yelensky stated that his department received requests for deferment from UOC clergy but rejected them. "We don't defer such people," Yelensky declared. What is this if not discrimination on religious grounds?
Or here's N. Poturaev, who called on local self-government bodies to determine themselves "which confession the territorial community belongs to". What is this if not a direct call to violate the rights of religious communities? After all, Ukrainian legislation recognizes the right of confessional self-determination only for religious communities themselves.
Manipulation 7: "transitions" to the OCU – a natural process?
The survey claims that 40% of respondents support transitions of communities from the UOC to the OCU. 9% do not support them. At the same time, those who don't care – 43%.
We are constantly being convinced that Ukrainian society has a demand for church transitions to the OCU. But even such questionable sociology as the "Rating" survey says that a minority supports this process. Moreover, this question contains obvious manipulation. After all, respondents were asked about transitions, that is, about voluntary change of confessional affiliation, not about forcible seizures or illegal votes. In reality, however, a huge number of "transitions" occur precisely in forcible and illegal forms.
So it turns out that respondents had in mind voluntary and legal transitions, when the decision is made by the religious community itself without external pressure. And the survey results are interpreted as if 40% support what is happening in real life with violence and seizures.
This is even more clearly seen in another figure. The survey claims that allegedly 49% of UOC believers have a positive attitude toward transitions from the UOC to the OCU. But this contradicts common sense. First, half of UOC parishioners can hardly approve of having their churches and church property taken away, vote results falsified, and communities illegally re-registered. And second, if half really don't mind transitioning to the OCU, why have there been so few such transitions during the years of war?
But it's worth imagining that the question was understood differently – "are you in favor of communities themselves voluntarily deciding which confession to belong to?" – and everything falls into place.
Commentary from commentators
Some comments from press conference participants deserve special attention.
Thus, V. Yelensky spoke about the "normality" of relations between believers of different confessions and that the state counted fewer than 20 (!) settlements where there is tension around transitions. But according to official data, there are about 30,000 settlements in Ukraine.
The 20 settlements where V. Yelensky saw church conflicts represent 0.067%. And although direct extrapolation is not entirely correct here, it's worth asking: where then did the 5% of those who experienced religious persecution personally come from? Or the 7% whose relatives experienced it?
Another statement by V. Yelensky: the state allegedly requires nothing from the UOC except withdrawal from the ROC. But the UOC has already withdrawn. This is evidenced by the decisions of the Council in Theophania on 27.05.2022, the official letter from Metropolitan Onuphrius to DESS, and other statements and documents. However, this makes no impression on the UOC's ill-wishers: they want to dictate to the Church themselves in what form it should formalize its "withdrawal." And isn't this blatant interference in internal church affairs?
Political scientist Oleg Zakyan stated that "a cassock is not grounds for indulgence." In the context of everything happening, this is also a stone thrown at the UOC.
But first, a cassock should also not become a presumption of guilt. And UOC clergy turn out to be guilty only of serving in an unwelcome Church. And second, the commission of illegal acts by individual priests should not entail collective responsibility for the entire religious organization. The betrayal of SBU employees in the first days and months of the war did not lead to the SBU being banned. Collaboration by representatives of police, national guard and prosecutor's office did not lead to the closure of these bodies. Why are double standards applied to the UOC?
Conclusions
The results of the current survey showed not the religious picture of society, but the fruits of a frenzied media campaign against the UOC. This campaign has led to the following.
First, it has become entrenched in public consciousness that the UOC consists of terrible "Moscow priests" working against Ukraine, and that the "connection with the ROC" is a proven fact.
Second, religious questions are no longer perceived as such. They become questions of "patriotism," security and so on.
Third, a significant part of society does not understand church issues but supports harsh measures against the UOC.
Fourth, support for the OCU is largely not ecclesiastical but political-identificational in nature. The OCU is perceived not so much as a church but as a symbol of Ukrainian statehood.
The media campaign against the UOC will end someday. Church questions will someday move from the political plane to the religious one. What figures will surveys show then? And will anyone be ashamed of today's figures?
